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Regional Institutional Development, Political Connections, and Entrepreneurial 
Performance in China’s Transition Economy 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
While prior research has emphasized the role of political connections in facilitating 
entrepreneurial performance in China’ early reform period (1978 – 1999), this study argues that 
regional institutions had been increasingly conducive to entrepreneurial activities and, thus, also 
played a key role in China’s entrepreneurial success during that period. The purpose of this study 
is twofold. First, it aims to demonstrate how regional institutional development facilitated 
entrepreneurial performance in China. Second, it aims to understand how formal institutional 
development among Chinese regions affected the role of political connections. Using a two-level 
hierarchical dataset on Chinese private enterprises, this study finds that not only legal protection 
of property rights but also the development of market system mattered for entrepreneurial 
performance. In addition, it shows that political connections played a diminishing role during 
regional institutional development in China. 
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1 Introduction 
One of the most important outcomes of China’s market-oriented reforms in the early reform 
period (1978 – 1999) is the emergence and rapid growth of domestic private entrepreneurial 
firms, which include both private and individual enterprises.1 While legally forbidden before the 
economic reforms and allowed to reemerge only in the late 1970s when China started its reforms, 
by 1998, there were already 1.2 million private enterprises and 31 million individual enterprises; 
and the two types of entrepreneurial firms accounted for one-third of national industrial output 
and one-fifth of national non-farm employment (International Finance Corporation (IFC) 2000). 
Such a rapid entrepreneurial growth was driven primarily by the high average 
performance of entrepreneurial firms, especially, private enterprises. Biennial national surveys of 
Chinese private enterprises suggest that the average return on capital – after-tax profits divided 
by total capital – ranged from 0.31 to 0.35 in the 1990s (Zhang and Ming 2000). Such a high 
profit rate was higher than not only that of the State-owned Enterprises (SOEs), but also that of 
Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) – China’s economic locomotives in the 1980s and 
early 1990s. According to Nee (2005), the average return on capital was around 0.10 for TVEs 
and below 0.05 for SOEs throughout the 1990s. Seeing the high returns for investment, potential 
entrepreneurs rushed into businesses, thus triggering rapid entrepreneurial growth in China’s 
early reform period (McMillan and Woodruff 2002).    
The high entrepreneurial performance, as well as the resulting rapid entrepreneurial 
growth, is puzzling. Although China adopted market-based policies ever since the late 1970s, the 
1 Domestic private entrepreneurial firms in China are mostly small and medium-sized enterprises owned by 
individual entrepreneurs. There are two types of private firms: non-farm private enterprises (siying qiye) and 
individual enterprises (getihu). The difference between private enterprises and individual enterprises is the number 
of employees: A private firm is a private enterprise if it has at least eight employees, but an individual enterprise if 
fewer than eight employees. In this paper, I use “private firm” to indicate both types of enterprises.  
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development of formal institutions was slow and difficult in general (Hoskisson et al. 2000). It is 
widely accepted that the national market and legal institutions were unconducive, if not 
detrimental, to private entrepreneurship in the first two decades of China’s economic reforms 
(Huang 2008; IFC 2000; Naughton 2007).   
To resolve this puzzle, prior research has emphasized the significance of informal social 
arrangements, particularly, guanxi (i.e., social relations), in China’s entrepreneurial success (e.g., 
Park and Luo 2001; Peng 2004; Tan, et al. 2009; Xin and Pearce 1996). Among various types of 
guanxi for entrepreneurs, political connections –vertical guanxi to the state and its agents –have 
obtained particular attention because of strong government intervention in the Chinese economy 
(Zhou 2013). Theoretically, political connections are argued to be able to facilitate 
entrepreneurial activities and performance under less developed formal institutions because they 
help entrepreneurs mobilize key resources and obtain private protection of property rights (Zhou 
2013). Empirically, a number of studies have consistently reported positive effects of political 
connections on entrepreneurial activities and performance in China (e.g., Peng and Luo 2000; 
Walder 2002; Wu 2006; Xin and Pearce 1996; Zhou 2009, 2013).   
However, it should be noted that political connections, as well as other informal social 
arrangements, may not fully account for the high entrepreneurial performance in China. A 
number of other explanations may be offered, such as fast economic growth and, thus, high 
demand for consumer goods during China’s early reform period (Hoskisson et al. 2000; Zhou 
2013). In particular, as Baumol (1990) pointed out, although informal arrangements such as 
political connections may help entrepreneurs adapt to a hostile institutional environment, 
entrepreneurial activities on average would not enjoy higher returns but have low payoffs instead 
and be even unproductive or destructive when formal institutional environment is not conducive.  
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Recently, an increasing number of studies have attempted to understand how formal 
institutions affect entrepreneurship and new venture growth in China’s transition economy. Some 
studies suggest that, compared to other transition or emerging economies, China’s more stable 
and efficient institutions have helped Chinese entrepreneurial firms take long-term views and 
grow faster (Batjargal et al. forthcoming; Hitt et al. 2004). Other studies show that formal 
institutions, in particular, legal protection of property rights, have a positive effect on 
entrepreneurial activities in China (Cull and Xu 2005; Lu and Tao 2010; Zhou 2011). 
Nonetheless, these studies, in general, do not account for why and how formal institutions related 
to entrepreneurship emerged and developed in China. Many of these studies also do not measure 
formal institutions directly but either use country dummy (China versus other transition or 
emerging country) or time (before a certain year versus after) to indicate institutional difference. 
And those studies that do measure formal institutions directly (e.g., Cull and Xu 2005; Zhou 
2011) usually focus primarily on legal protection of property rights while rarely on other 
important aspects of institutional development. In addition, while there is a debate on the effect 
of institutional development on the significance of political connections, prior studies have rarely 
tested this effect empirically (Zhou 2013).     
Continuing this new literature that emphasizes the role of formal institutions, this study 
first explains how formal institutions related to entrepreneurship emerged and developed in 
China’s early transition period. It suggests that, although often considered unconducive to private 
entrepreneurial firms in general, the institutional environment in the first two decades of China’s 
market-oriented reforms was not homogeneous throughout China; rather, there have been 
significant variations in formal institutions among different regions as a result of the 
decenteralization reform enacted in the early 1980s (Breznitz and Murphree 2011; Montinola, et 
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al. 1995; Weingast 1995). In addition, regional governments have emulated the regulatory 
policies of the fast growing regions in order to facilitate economic development and thus to 
increase regional revenue. Out of the regional emulation process, new legal and market 
institutions, which were conducive to entrepreneurial growth, were invented and diffused across 
Chinese regions since the early 1990s (Zhou 2011).    
In addition, based on new institutional economic theory (especially, North 1990, 1991), 
this study aims to systematically demonstrate how regional institutional development affected 
entrepreneurial performance, as well as the role of political connections, in China’s early reform 
period. First, building on North (1990, 1991), this study argues that not only legal protection of 
property rights but also the development of market system played a significantly positive role in 
facilitating entrepreneurial performance in China. Market system here means a system of 
societywide coordination of human activities not by central command but by mutual interactions 
in the form of transactions (Lindblom 2001). Some prior studies conjecture that expansion of 
market system may have an even more influential effect on entrepreneurship than legal 
protection in the early period of market transition (Smallbone and Welter 2001; Zhou 2011). Yet, 
the effect of market development has rarely been empirically examined. China’s early transition 
period provides a unique opportunity to examine the effect of market development because, 
compared to other emerging and transition economies, building a market system was the central 
task for, and also the most successful achievement of, China’s central and local governments 
(Qian 2000).       
Second, this study aims to understand how formal institutional development affected the 
role of political connections. Many prior studies, including those on Chinese firms, assume that 
political connections substitute for formal institutions, and, thus, their effects may decrease as the 
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latter improves. Yet, empirically, it is not clear whether they may complement or substitute for 
formal institutions, since political connections continue to play a significant role in China even 
today (Tan, et al. 2009; Zhou 2009) and even in advanced market economies (Dixit 2004; Faccio 
2006; Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). Based on the China case, this study demonstrates that political 
connections play a diminishing role during both legal and market development, thus providing 
empirical support to the substitution argument.  
This study employs a two-level, hierarchical quantitative dataset on Chinese private 
enterprises for hypothesis testing. The firm level data include a nationally representative sample 
of 1946 Chinese entrepreneurial firms in 1996. The provincial level data include a number of 
institutional and economic variables that directly measure the institutional and economic 
development in each province around 1996. By the mid 1990s, formal institutional environment 
in many Chinese provinces has already developed substantially, thanks to both Deng Xiaoping’s 
Southern Tour in early 1992 and the diffusion of the liberal state models across Chinese regions 
since 1992 (Zhou 2011, 2012a). Thus, if the institutional account of this paper is correct, one 
would expect higher performance of entrepreneurial firms and less significance of political 
connections among provinces with more developed legal and market systems.               
 
2 The regional institutional development 
2.1 Formal institutions  
Institutions are humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction (North 1990). They 
include both what individuals are prohibited from doing and under what conditions some 
individuals are permitted to undertake certain activities. As such, institutions define the choice 
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set of economic actors and, therefore, determine transaction and production costs and hence the 
profitability and feasibility of engaging in economic activity (North 1991).  
  Institutions can be either informal or formal. Informal institutions are rules based on 
implicit understandings and not accessible through written documents and not necessarily 
sanctioned through formal position, and formal institutions are written rules that are determined 
and executed through formal position, such as authority or ownership (Zenger, et al. 2002). 
Although new institutional economists have long argued that both formal and informal 
institutions matter in economic transactions, it is formal institutions that have attracted more 
interest among new institutional scholars until very recently (Dixit 2004).     
 Among all formal institutions, the existing literature has focused primarily on property 
rights institutions. North argued that economic actors will not invest, produce, or engage in 
market transactions if they do not expect to be able to keep the fruits of their efforts (North 1990; 
North and Weingast 1989). Indeed, many empirical studies suggest that a credible commitment 
on the part of the state to protecting private property rights is necessary for long-term economic 
growth (e.g., Acemoglu and Johnson 2005; Johnson, et al. 2002; La Porta, et al. 1997). Besides 
property rights institutions, a developed market system is also crucial for entrepreneurs to 
capture the gains from trade and thus, for long term economic growth. According to Lindblom 
(2001), market system is a system of societywide coordination of human activities not by central 
command but by mutual interactions. A market system emerges when mutual interactions of 
buyers and sellers, rather than government planning, organize or coordinate economic activities 
in a society. Substantively, it can be identified when various markets (e.g., labor markets, 
agricultural markets, markets for services and goods, markets for intermediate services and 
goods, and capital markets) are proliferating and linked tightly with each other through the price 
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mechanism (Lindblom 2001, chapter 1). Although seldom examined empirically, North (1991) 
argued that a developed market system can raise the benefits of cooperative solutions and reduce 
transaction and production costs per exchange so that the potential gains from trade are 
realizeable (see, also, Gwartney and Lawson 2002; Zhou 2010). 
 
2.2 Development of formal institutions across Chinese regions  
It is generally accepted that, unlike Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union states, the 
Chinese state did not have any government programs to deliberately develop its domestic private 
sector in the first two decades of the economic reform (e.g., IFC 2000; McMillan and Woodruff 
2002; Tsang 1994; Zhou 2009, 2011). And thus, the national institutional environment, in 
general, was against rather than conducive to private entrepreneurship even by the early 2000s.  
Indeed, although private entrepreneurial firms were allowed to reemerge at the end of the 1970s 
when the Chinese government began its market-oriented economic reforms, the state restricted 
the private sector such that it could only play a marginal, stop-gap role in the economy for 
socialist ideological reasons before Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour in 1992 (Chang and 
MacMillan 1991; IFC 2000; Tsang 1994). And, even after China embraced the market economic 
system since 1992, it has been noted that the central government was still reluctant to provide a 
set of national legal and market institutions needed for healthy entrepreneurial growth throughout 
the 1990s and early 2000s (IFC 2000; Zhou 2011, 2012a). Not only were well-functioning 
markets (particularly, credit, equity, and labor markets) largely absent (Naughton 2007), but the 
central government still controlled most key economic resources and kept the private sector at a 
subordinate and near-pariah status, discriminating against it when distributing these resources 
(IFC 2000). Furthermore, the central government did not provide substantive legal protection for 
 9 
  
and enforcement of private property rights. It granted formal constitutional recognition to the 
private sector only in 1999, and private property rights were not protected even rhetorically in 
the Chinese Constitution until 2004 (Zhou 2009, 2011, 2012a).  
Unconducive national institutions notwithstanding, the institutional environment in 
China, in fact, was not homogeneous; rather, there was large variation in formal legal and market 
institutions among Chinese regions (Montinola, et al. 1995). And such regional legal and market 
institutions had developed at an increasingly faster pace, especially, since the early 1990s (Zhou 
2011). A question, then, is: how did legal and market institutions emerge and develop among 
Chinese regions?  
Formal institutions, for sure, do not emerge in a vacuum. There have been several 
accounts on the emergence and development of legal and market institutions in China. Some 
researchers emphasize the external influence as a result of the opening of the Chinese economy 
to the outside world. Steinfeld (2010), for example, argued that China has in many ways handed 
over – outsourced – the remaking of its domestic economy and domestic institutions to foreign 
companies and foreign rule-making authorities. While this account may indeed find a number of 
empirical evidences, it should be noted that, for a large country like China, foreign trade and 
investment per se are unlike to be quantitatively as important as small countries; and even their 
effects on institutional change ultimately depend on internal changes (Qian 2000). As such, a 
number of researchers have focused on the internal sources of institutional change, in particular, 
the initiatives of regional and local governments (see, e.g., Breznitz and Murphree 2011; 
Montinola, et al. 1995; Qian 2000).  
It is noted that the Chinese central reformers began to transfer government authority from 
central to provincial and local levels in 1979 in order to enjoin government officials at these 
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levels to support profitable economic development (Naughton 2007; see also Zhou 2011). After 
the decentralization reform, provincial and local governments became regulators of their 
economies. They could issue business licenses, coordinate business development, resolve 
business disputes, and enact tax policies. They also acquired the authority to determine the 
structure of regional expenditure, which was linked to the revenues generated in the region (Qian 
2000). As a result, since then, although remaining de jure a unitary state, China has in many 
ways functioned as a de facto market-preserving federalist state (Blanchard and Shleifer 2005; 
Montinola, et al. 1995). 
A market-preserving federalist structure is argued to have an advantage in facilitating 
regional experimentation in terms of regulatory policies and imitation of successful ones 
(Blanchard and Shleifer 2005; Montinola, et al. 1995). In China, given the impossibility of 
planning for economic reform ex ante, as it was complex in nature and had no historical 
precedence, regional bureaucrats had to experiment with whatever regulatory policies were 
considered most appropriate for their own region, or imitate successful policies in other regions 
(Breznitz and Murphree 2011; Zhou 2011). A number of successful regulatory models, such as 
the Southern Jiangsu model, the Guangdong model, and the Zhejiang model, were thus attempted 
since the early 1980s (Chow 2002). Some of these models (e.g., the Southern Jiangsu model) 
resembled the developmental state model that emphasizes government ownership (Oi 1992). 
Others (e.g., the Guangdong model and the Zhejiang model), however, were much closer to the 
liberal state model, which relies on the private sector as the engine of growth and catalyst for 
generating wealth (Pisani and Pagan 2004; Zhou 2011).  
Not surprisingly, the developmental-state-like models based on government ownership 
were more popular among regional governments in the first decade of the reform when China 
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still embraced the planned economic system (Huang and Di 2004). However, following Deng 
Xiaoping’s Southern Tour in 1992, after which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) pledged to 
transform China’s planned economic system into a market economic system, the liberal-state-
like models (particularly, the Zhejiang model) started to gain popularity and were thus emulated 
widely across many provinces.2 It is argued here that it was the diffusion of the policies of the 
liberal-state-like models that facilitated formal institutional development across China.  
Overall, the liberal-state-like models (in particular, the Zhejiang model) encouraged the 
growth of market institutions and provided much better protection to private property rights than 
the developmental-state-like models. First, governments under such models did not intervene in 
the economy directly. And regional bureaucrats were keen to facilitate the development of 
“special markets” – marketplaces for specific goods – and allowed these market institutions to 
allocate goods and resources. They were also keen to develop private-sector institutions, 
especially local private financial institutions such as informal credit markets, to provide private 
firms key factor resources, which were not easily accessible for them (IFC 2000; Zhou 2009, 
2011, 2012a). As a result, government allocation faded gradually and market allocation was 
increasingly common. Second, governments under such models usually tolerated and encouraged 
private entrepreneurship even when those in other regions were suppressing it (Huang and Di 
2004; Zhou 2011). During the early reform period, especially after the 1989 Tiananmen Square 
event, there were times when the central government tried to illegalize private firms and, thus, 
sent down inspection teams to those regions where private entrepreneurship thrived in order to 
collect evidences against it. However, powerful provincial bureaucrats in these regions (such as 
2 For details of the competition between the developmental-state-like models and the liberal-state-like models in 
reform-era China, see Huang and Di (2004); Zhou (2011). 
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those in Zhejiang) stood up and successfully protected private firms from being closed down by 
central inspectors (Huang 2005; Zhou 2012a).  
As the liberal-state-like models started to spread across many Chinese regions since 
1992, many provincial governments issued special government orders throughout the 1990s and 
early 2000s to elevate the status of private firms/entrepreneurs, to facilitate market allocation of 
factor resources, such as capital, to remove discriminative legal/regional practices against them, 
and to ease complex administrative procedures for them (Huang 2005). For example, the 
provincial government of Jiangxi (an inland and less-developed province) had taken a number of 
deregulatory measures to liberalize the regulatory environment for the private sector. Such 
measures included simplifying administrative and regulatory procedures for private firms, 
strengthening protection of legal rights of private firms, extending preferential policies formerly 
awarded only to public firms or foreign invested firms to private firms, and facilitating special 
markets, e.g., credit markets (Huang 2005; Zhou 2011).       
Figure 1 shows the status of legal and market development across Chinese provinces in 
the mid 1990s. It suggests that Chinese provinces varied widely in terms of both legal protection 
of property rights and market development (see section 4.3 for how these two institutional 
variables are measured) by that time. Yet, using Guangdong – the province that had the highest 
market development level – as the benchmark, many provinces had already achieved relatively 
high level of market development then. And such provinces included not just Southeastern 
Coastal provinces (e.g., Guangdong, Hainan, and Fujian) or centrally-administered municipal 
cities (Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai, and Tianjin), which enjoyed more regulatory autonomy 
and thus experimented market-oriented reforms earlier than others, but also some inner provinces 
such as Hunan and Hebei that emulated the free economic policies of the more liberal provinces 
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(Montinola, et al. 1995; Zhou 2011). In addition, this figure suggests that market and legal 
institutions did not improve side by side in China. Although many market developed provinces 
(e.g., Guangdong and the four centrally-administered municipal cities) also had quite high level 
of legal protection of property rights, it was some northern inland provinces (e.g., Gansu, 
Ningxia, Shaanxi) that enjoyed higher levels of legal development, a notion which has been 
noted by prior researchers and also supported by anecdotal evidences (Fan and Wang 2000; Zhou 
2011). One possible explanation was that, given their extremely unfavorable locations that 
hindered market development, those northern inland provinces had chosen to develop legal 
institutions first to facilitate economic growth (Fan and Wang 2000).    
   
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
3 Regional institutional development, political connections, and entrepreneurial 
performance 
Given the regional diffusion of legal and regulatory practices, it is argued here, based on the new 
institutional economic theory, that regional legal and market development may have a positive 
effect on the performance of private entrepreneurial firms, thus facilitating rapid entrepreneurial 
growth in China’s early reform period.  
The recent entrepreneurship literature has highlighted association between formal 
institutions and entrepreneurship (see, e.g., a review in Miniti and Levesque 2008). According to 
North (1990), institutions can affect entrepreneurship because, as “rules of the game” in a 
society, they structure entrepreneurial incentives to invest and produce. In particular, the recent 
literature has focused on the fundamental importance of secure property rights. Based on the 
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analysis of the rise of the Western world, North and his colleagues (North and Weingast 1989; 
North and Thomas 1973) have forcefully argued that a credible commitment on the part of the 
state to protecting private property rights is necessary for entrepreneurial investment and 
performance and, in turn, long-term economic growth. Also, many empirical studies have found 
that well-functioning formal legal systems to protect property rights, which include intellectual 
property rights, are a key to facilitate entrepreneurial performance and innovation in both 
developed and developing worlds (e.g., Acemoglu and Johnson 2005; Cohen et al. 2000; Huang 
and Murray 2009; Huang 2010; Johnson, et al. 2002; La Porta, et al. 1997).  
In China, cases of infringement of property rights including intellectual property rights of 
private entrepreneurs by government agents, non-governmental organizations, or other citizens 
were often reported throughout the 1980s and 1990s (e.g., Chang and MacMillan 1991; Nee 
2000; Tsang 1994). Nee (2000), for example, reported a case of how a group of villagers raided 
an entrepreneur’s orange grove with the tolerance of and even support from village cadres in 
Fujian Province. This case, he argued, “highlights the precarious status of private entrepreneurs 
in an institutional context in which private property rights based on legal contracts are poorly 
understood” (Nee 2000:79). Similarly, Yusheng Peng (2004:1057) suggested that “cadre 
predation and political discrimination were probably the biggest obstacle to the development of 
private entrepreneurship [in China], so much so that one county government felt it necessary to 
‘put cats in the cage and let the mice prosper’, with cats metaphorically referring to predatory 
cadres.”   
These cases of infringement of the property rights of private entrepreneurs had negative 
effects on entrepreneurial activities and performance. Expecting that they could not keep the 
fruits of their efforts because of weak protection of property rights, many Chinese entrepreneurs 
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refrained from reinvesting in their own firms (IFC 2000; Tsang 1994; Zhou 2009) or even 
transferred their profits to other countries, often secretly, and, thus, triggering large-scale capital 
flight since the early 1990s in China (Sicular 1998).  
Such negative effects, for sure, did not serve the interests of regional governments, which 
strived to facilitate economic growth and, thus, to maximize government revenues, since the 
decentralization reform. As a result, as discussed in the previous section, a number of regional 
governments had been taking measures to provide protection to private property rights. Many 
regional governments, for example, took a number of measures to stop arbitrary charges, fines, 
or apportionments by government agents on private firms since the early 1990s (Zhou 2013). In 
addition, many regions also strengthened punishment for infringement of intellectual property 
rights (Huang 2010; Zhou 2012b). Such measures to protect private property rights would 
facilitate entrepreneurial investment and performance because entrepreneurs could keep more 
profits for their own and, thus, put more entrepreneurial/innovative efforts in their businesses. 
Thus, based on the new institutional perspective, we have:  
 
Hypothesis 1: The more protected the private property rights in a region, the higher the 
economic performance of entrepreneurial firms in that region.   
 
Besides legal protection of property rights, North (1991) argued that a developed market 
system is also crucial for entrepreneurs because it helps capture the gains from trade. Without a 
developed market system, entrepreneurs may face two distinctive transaction cost problems 
(North 1991). One is classical problem of agency under which the entrepreneur would often be 
confined to short-distance personalized exchange, as in ancient societies (North 1991), or have to 
use kinship ties for trade, as the Maghribis did in the Middle Age (Greif 2006). And this problem 
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would increasingly become a major dilemma as the size and volume of trade become large as in 
contemporary economies. The second problem consists of contract negotiation and enforcement, 
which has also become a major dilemma in contemporary world because entrepreneurs are 
increasingly engaged in long-distance trade, which makes contract negotiation and enforcement 
more complex. 
 These two transaction costs problems would have a negative effect on entrepreneurial 
performance. First, the agency problem would hinder the development of long-distance trade, 
and, thus, entrepreneurial firms would be confined to small local markets but could not expand to 
larger regional or national markets. Second, the problem of contract negotiation and enforcement 
would divert entrepreneurial energy and resources from productive activities and, thus, reduce 
entrepreneurial performance (Baumol 1990). A developed market system could help resolve both 
problems of transaction costs, thus facilitating entrepreneurial performance. First, under a 
developed market system, factor resources and commodities are freely mobile within a unified 
market; and market information (e.g., the prices of various factors and commodities) is readily 
available and disseminated within the market (Lindblom 2001; North 1991). As a result, 
searching and information costs would be greatly reduced for the entrepreneurs. Such reduction 
in searching and information costs could, ex ante, make cheating a less feasible and profitable 
option between principals and agents and between traders. Second, under a developed market 
system, market exchanges are governed by independent, third party enforcement organizations 
usually sanctioned by the government, which enjoys legitimate coercive power (North 1990). 
Thus, any disputes between principals and agents and between anonymous traders would be 
resolved, ex post, less costly by an independent third party, such as a modern court (Greif 2006; 
North 1991).  Based on both reasons, therefore, it is argued that a more developed market system 
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could facilitate entrepreneurial performance because it helps resolve the two transaction cost 
problems, thus bringing more gains from trade (in particular, from long-distance trade as in 
contemporary economies).  
It has also been noted that a developed market system could facilitate entrepreneurial 
performance through ensuring access to crucial resources such as finance (Acs and Szerb 2007; 
IFC 2000; Zhou 2009; 2013). One example here is the development of financial markets. 
Virtually all new entrepreneurial firms require some initial amount of capital and often more as 
they grow. However, it is usually difficult for new ventures to obtain capital in many less 
developed and transition economies due to not only the generic information asymmetry problem 
between entrepreneurs and lenders but also the poorly developed financial system (Amit, et al. 
1990; IFC 2000; Zhou 2009). As the financial market develops, therefore, new ventures would 
access capital more easily and their performance may increase as a result.      
 Above, it is noted that many regional governments in China have been actively nurturing 
and growing market institutions (e.g., facilitating the development of special markets and 
private-sector institutions such as informal credit markets), thus, we have: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The more developed the market system in a region, the higher the 
economic performance of entrepreneurial firms in that region.    
 
As discussed above, prior studies have argued that political connections played a key role 
in facilitating entrepreneurial activities and performance in China. Given that many Chinese 
regions have undergone major formal institutional development and such development may also 
facilitate entrepreneurial performance, one may wonder how the role of political connections 
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might change as formal institutions such as property rights institutions and market system 
improve.  
To answer this question, let us first take a look at the effect of property rights institutions 
on the role of political connections. There are, however, conflicting views in the existing 
literature on this effect. According to one view, political connections may complement legal 
institutions for property rights protection. Some researchers argue that the positive role of 
political connections in many less developed and transition economies like China may be due not 
to the absence of developed property rights institutions and market systems but to the long-
existing political markets that favor resource allocation and problem solving through political 
power (Boisot and Child 1996). Even in those former transition economies that have successfully 
established rule of law, such as Hungary, political connections were still found to play an 
important role in political and economic arenas because of newly emerged political markets 
(McDermott 2003; Stark and Vedres 2012). This line of reasoning, therefore, suggests that the 
effect of political connections would remain positive and change little even when formal 
property rights institutions improve.   
Another view, however, suggests that political connections and formal property rights 
institutions are substitutable (Sun, et al. 2010; Xin and Pearce 1996; Zhou 2013). Prior studies 
suggest that political connections affect entrepreneurship through two mechanisms, i.e., 
facilitating acquisition of resources and information and providing private protection of property 
rights (Zhou 2013). In a transition economy, cases of infringement of private property rights 
would decrease substantially as long as the government strengthens legal institutions for property 
rights protection and, thus, increasing penalties for such infringement cases. Entrepreneurs, 
therefore, may turn to political connections less often for property rights protection under 
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improving legal institutions. And for any new infringement cases, entrepreneurs may be inclined 
to resolve them more through the improved legal institutions than political connections because 
the former may be less costly and more reliable (Siegel 2007; Shleifer and Vishny 1994). This 
line of reasoning, therefore, predicts the declining significance of political connections as formal 
property rights institutions improve.  
Based on the above two lines of reasoning, we have the following competing hypotheses. 
Here, Hypothesis 3.1 is based on the complement view and Hypothesis 3.2 the substitution one. 
 
Hypothesis 3.1: The effect of political connections on the economic performance of 
entrepreneurial firms would not change as property rights regime changes in a region.   
Hypothesis 3.2: The more protected the private property rights in a region, the lower the 
effect of political connections on the economic performance of entrepreneurial firms.   
 
Similarly, there are also conflicting views on the effect of market system on the role of 
political connections. On the one hand, the complement view suggests that market system 
development would have little effect on the role of political connections. As discussed above for 
property rights institutions, this view argues that the positive role of political connections in 
many less developed and transition economies is related primarily to long-existing or newly 
emerged political markets but not to the absence of either property rights institutions or 
developed market systems. Moreover, it is found that political connections are still significant for 
entrepreneurs and firms to obtain a number of benefits, such as relaxed regulatory oversight, 
preferential treatment in competition for government contracts, and many others, even in 
advanced market economies (Dixit 2004; Faccio 2006; Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). Therefore, 
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this view suggests that the effect of political connections may remain positive and change little 
when market system develops in a transition economy.  
On the other hand, the substitution argument suggests that market system development 
would reduce the significance of political connections. As mentioned above, one mechanism that 
political connections affect entrepreneurship in a less developed economy is through facilitating 
acquisition of resources and information. In a transition economy, as the government introduces 
market-oriented reforms, thus increasing market allocation of factor resources, entrepreneurs 
would obtain resources and market information more easily through formal markets (Peng and 
Luo 2000; Zhou 2009). As such, this view predicts that the benefits of political connections in 
acquiring resources and information may decrease.  
Based on these two lines of reasoning, we can derive the following competing 
hypotheses. Here, Hypothesis 4.1 is based on the complement view and Hypothesis 4.2 the 
substitution one. 
 
Hypothesis 4.1: The effect of political connections on the economic performance of 
entrepreneurial firms would not change as the market system changes in a region.   
Hypothesis 4.2: The more developed the market system in a region, the lower the effect 
of political connections on the economic performance of entrepreneurial firms.     
 
4 Data and methods 
4.1 Data 
I tested the above hypotheses by using a two-level, hierarchical quantitative dataset on Chinese 
private enterprises. The firm level data include a nationally representative sample of 1946 
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Chinese entrepreneurial firms in 1996. The provincial level data include a number of institutional 
and economic variables that measure the institutional and economic development in each 
province around 1996. The mid 1990s saw the unprecedented growth in the number, size, and 
contribution of the domestic private sector (IFC 2000; Naughton 2007; Zhou 2011). However, as 
discussed in Section 2, the domestic private sector in general still faced deficient national 
institutions then. Yet, during that period, the liberal-state-like models had already started to 
spread across many Chinese regions such that regional institutional environments had become 
increasingly conducive to private entrepreneurship.  
 The firm level data for hypothesis testing come from the 1997 National Survey of 
Chinese Private Enterprises, which was designed and administered by a joint research team from 
the All China Federation of Industry and Commerce and the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences (Zhang and Ming 2000). Following the definition of private enterprise specified in the 
Tentative Stipulations on Private Enterprises, promulgated by the central government in 1988, 
the survey included only domestic private firms that had at least eight employees and were 
owned by private entrepreneurs at the end of 1996.  
Using a stratified sampling method, the survey selected an almost nationally 
representative sample of 1,946 (or 0.2 percent) of 960,000 private enterprises registered with the 
State Administration for Industry and Commerce in 1996, in 21 of 31 provinces (including 
autonomous regions and province-level municipal cities). Five of these 21 provinces were in the 
Southeastern-Coastal regions, four in Northern regions, six in Western regions, and four in Mid-
Central regions. The sampling involved two stages. In the first, a pre-specified number of 
counties were selected in each province based on economic development levels, so that both rich 
and poor counties were represented. In the second stage, a pre-specified number of private firms 
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were selected in each county based on location and primary industrial sector. Both urban and 
rural firms were chosen; and within each urban/rural area, firms from all industrial sectors were 
sampled. The number of sampled firms in each province, county, urban/rural area, and sector 
was proportionate to the population size of the private enterprises in each of these categories. 
The survey was based on face-to-face intensive interviews with both entrepreneurs (i.e., 
the largest owners) and accountants to collect information about the entrepreneurs and their firms 
in 1996.  Interviewers were primarily local employees of the All China Federation of Industry 
and Commerce who were familiar with local private entrepreneurs, and were trained intensively 
by the joint research team before the survey.  
The dataset from this survey is appropriate for testing above hypotheses because it 
includes a rich set of questions, including the size, history, and financial/accounting information 
of each of the firms, and family background, social connections, human capital, and occupational 
history of the entrepreneurs. Most variables on the basic characteristics of the firms and 
entrepreneurs in the 1997 data are also available in the 1995 and 2000 National Surveys of 
Chinese Private Enterprises, which include more firms and more provinces, but not some of the 
key variables (e.g., political connections) necessary for testing the hypotheses. Distributions of 
common variables are very similar across the three surveys.        
 I assembled the provincial level data from two widely-used second-hand sources. The 
first source is the 1995-1997 China Statistical Yearbooks (China Statistical Bureau 1995, 1996, 
1997) for provincial level economic variables and the second 2000 annual report of National 
Economic Research Institute (NERI) Indices of Marketization of China’s Provinces for 
institutional development in each province (Fan and Wang 2000). The NERI indices use the 
methodology of Economic Freedom of the World to rank Chinese provinces according to their 
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level of market/regulatory/legal development on five general topics: (1) relationship between 
government and the market, (2) the non-state sector, (3) the manufactured goods market, (4) the 
factor market, and (5) intermediary institutions and legal environment (Gwartney, et al. 2005; 
also see Zhou 2011). Under each topic, there are a number of indices that reflect different aspects 
of the topic with each index ranging from 0 to 10. Given that each index reflects one aspect of 
market/regulatory/legal development in a province, the NERI indices allow researchers to 
recombine these indices to construct new indices for such factors as development of market 
system and legal protection of property rights. 
 
4.2 Dependent variables 
Economic performance of entrepreneurial firms is measured with two standard measures in the 
literature. Both measures come from the firm-level data. The first measure is return on capital, 
which is after-tax profit divided by total capital in 1996. This measure quantifies how efficient a 
firm generates cash flow relative to the capital it has invested in its business and is affected 
positively by factor inputs and entrepreneurial efforts. Given that market development may allow 
entrepreneurs get access to factor resources more easily in a transition economy (Fan and Wang 
2000), and given that improvement in property rights protection elicits entrepreneurial efforts 
(North 1990), entrepreneurs may enjoy higher return on capital as the two formal institutions 
improve. Profit margin – the second measure – is after-tax profit as a percentage of sales revenue 
in 1996. In general, it provides an indication of efficiency in that it captures the amount of 
surplus generated per unit of the product or service sold, and is a function of entrepreneurial 
efforts, which, as discussed above, are affected by property rights protection.   
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It is often noted that Chinese firms tend to underreport or even not report their profit level 
for tax and political reasons (IFC 2000; Zhou 2012a, 2012b). While this may be indeed a 
problem for studies on Chinese firms, it is noted that the means of the two variables are 
consistent with those of similar national surveys on private enterprises from other years, 
suggesting that the two measures may have reasonably high external reliability. The average 
return on capital from this survey is 0.35, very close to the one from a 1993 national survey 
(0.31); and the average profit margin is 12.2 percent, also close to the one from the 2000 national 
survey (9.6 percent). Because the distribution of the dependent variables are skewed, their 
logarithmic form is used (a small number is used to replace zero for logarithmic transformation). 
As a result, 33 firms that reported negative profits were removed from the data. The dropped 
firms accounted for 1.7 percent of the sample, were a little younger and smaller, and were owned 
more likely by female owners. This procedure leaves a working sample of 1913 entrepreneurial 
firms. 
 
 4.3 Independent variables 
The two independent variables – legal protection of property rights and market development – 
are both provincial level variables and are constructed from the NERI indices.  Legal protection 
of property rights is an average of two components. The first component is the number of legal 
cases on infringement of economic rights divided by total GDP in a province. This component is 
supposed to be negatively correlated with legal protection of property rights and, thus, its inverse 
is used (Fan and Wang 2000). The second component is perceptions of the firms about how well 
their legal business activities were protected by the law. This component came from firm level 
surveys done by the NERI. Both components, which were transformed to range from 0 to 10 in 
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the original source, were calculated as a three-year average (1995 – 1997). Therefore, legal 
protection of property rights also ranges roughly from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating 
higher level of protection of property rights in a province. 
 Based on Lindblom (2001), market development is an average of nine components in 
three general topics. The first general topic is relationship between the government and the 
market, which includes three components: extent to which the market was used as a primary 
mechanism for resource allocation, extent to which government reduced tax burden for firms, 
and extent to which government reduced micro-intervention into firms. These components, 
therefore, measure the extent to which the market mechanism has replaced government planning 
in coordinating economy and the over freedom of sellers and buyers in economic exchange (Fan 
and Wang 2000; Gwartney, et al. 2005). The second topic is the development of the 
manufactured goods markets, which includes two components: extent to which prices of 
commodities were determined by the market and extent to which trade barriers within the region 
were removed. As such, the two components measure the extent to which voluntary exchange 
and free mobility of goods were a norm in the product market (Gwartney and Lawson 2002). The 
third topic is the development of the factor markets, which includes four components: 
competition in the banking industry, extent to which bank credits were allocated by the market, 
extent to which labor market was fluid, and significance of external investments in a regional 
economy. These four components measure the extent of free competition and free mobility of 
factor resources in the factor market (see Djankov, et al. 2004). All above components were 
calculated as a three-year average (1995 – 1997).  
Overall, our variable of market development is consistent with Lindblom’s (2001) 
definition of market system, as it directly measures the proliferation of product and factor 
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markets in a region. It has relatively high external reliability. It is positively correlated with 
another index on market system development in each province in the early 1990s constructed by 
Chen, Wu, and Xie (2000). The correlation coefficient between the two indices is 0.70. This 
variable also ranges roughly from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating higher level of market 
development in a province. 
   
4.4 Control variables 
There are both province-level and firm-level control variables. The province-level ones are as 
follows. GDP growth rate is an indicator of regional economic health, which may be positively 
related to entrepreneurial performance (Bowen and Clercq 2008). GDP per capita is a measure 
of economic development. I divided 1000 into this variable to facilitate interpretation. Prior 
studies suggest that GDP per capita may have a nonlinear effect on entrepreneurship (Martinez 
2005; Zhou 2011). That is, entrepreneurial performance initially decreases and later increases as 
GDP per capita increases. Thus, a quadratic term of this variable is also controlled. Both GDP 
growth rate and GDP per capita were measured as three-year (1994-1996) averages to adjust for 
yearly fluctuations.  
Eastern-coastal province is a binary variable, coded 1 if a province is located in the 
Eastern Coastal regions; 0, otherwise. These regions started economic and regulatory reforms 
earlier and also had better infrastructure than inland provinces. Thus, firms located in these 
regions may enjoy higher returns. Centrally administered city is also a binary variable, coded 1 if 
a provincial region is a centrally administered municipal city – Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and 
Chongqing; 0, otherwise. These cities are institutionally and economically different from other 
provincial regions because of their closer relationships with the central government.  
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The firm-level control variables include the characteristics of the entrepreneur and the 
firm. As discussed in Section 1, prior studies have argued that political connections of the 
entrepreneur played a key role in China’s entrepreneurial success. Based on the prior literature 
(e.g., Faccio 2006; Johnson and Mitton 2003; Zhou 2013), a private firm is defined as having 
political connections if its largest owner – the entrepreneur – has strong social network ties with 
at least one current government official. The survey included a series of questions directly 
related to this definition. It asked whether the entrepreneur was a government official in any 
period before starting the firm and whether any of the entrepreneur’s strong ties – father, mother, 
most intimate relatives, best friends, spouse, or adult children – was a government official 
currently or before retirement. Thus, political connection is a binary variable, coded 1 if the 
entrepreneur was a government official in any period before starting the firm, or if a close 
personal connection – the entrepreneur’s father, mother, most intimate relatives, good friends, 
spouse, and adult children – was a government official currently or before retirement; 0, 
otherwise. Here I included those entrepreneurs who were government officials previously 
because these people usually retained former colleagues/associates as close political contacts.  
For other control variables concerning the entrepreneur, gender and human capital 
variables including education and age are often considered to affect entrepreneurial performance 
(e.g., Carroll and Mosakowski 1987; Hamilton 2000). Thus, female is a binary variable, coded 1 
if an entrepreneur was female; 0, otherwise. The survey asked the entrepreneurs their level of 
education. I created three dummies to indicate the educational level – lower than senior high 
school degree, senior high school graduate, and college graduate or above. Age is 1997 minus 
the year of the entrepreneur’s birth. This variable is taken logarithm to adjust for skewed 
distribution. 
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For variables concerning the firm, firm age and firm size are commonly used in 
entrepreneurship studies. Younger firms and smaller firms may have lower entrepreneurial 
performance due to the liability of newness and liability of smallness, respectively, and, thus, 
fewer entrepreneurial opportunities (e.g., Acs and Audretsch 1988; Hannan and Freeman 1989). 
Firm size here is measured by total assets at the end of 1996. Both firm age and firm size are 
taken logarithm to adjust for their skewed distribution. Some de facto private firms (i.e., firms 
started and owned by private entrepreneurs) in China were registered as public firms (i.e., State-
Owned Enterprises (SOEs) or urban/rural collective firms) in order to take advantage of 
favorable government treatment in terms of both property rights protection and resource 
acquisition (Nee 2005). The survey managed to include some such de facto private firms and 
asked a question involving registration status in 1996. Thus, public firm is a binary variable, 
coded 1 if the firm was registered as public in 1996; 0, otherwise. City firm is a binary variable 
coded 1 if the main establishment of the firm was located in a large city; 0, otherwise. This 
variable is controlled because firms in cities (particularly large ones) enjoyed better legal and 
market infrastructures. The data indicated 14 industrial sectors for the main business line of the 
firms. So, fourteen dummy variables for industrial sectors are also created. 
 
4.5 Model specification 
The data used here are a multi-stage stratified sample of firms nested within provinces, which 
have substantial regulatory autonomy as discussed previously. As a result, firms within each 
province tend to be more similar to each other. In addition, the firm-level outcome variables – 
return on capital and profit margin – are predicted as a function of both firm-level and province-
level variables. Clearly, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method is not appropriate here to analyze 
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such clustered data, which violate the randomness assumption of OLS. A most appropriate 
estimation strategy is to use hierarchical linear modeling (HLM), which has a specific goal to 
deal with both clustering and cross-level effects and, thus, produces more efficient estimates than 
one would obtain using OLS or any other method that relies on the OLS slope estimates but 
produces correct standard errors (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002).  A general representation of the 
HLM models that I estimated is shown in the following equation: 
 
Yij =  α + a'Xij  + b'Xj + uj + eij ,   (1) 
 
for i = 1, …, nj firms in province j; j = 1, …, 21 provinces. In the above equation, Yij is the 
dependent variable, either return on capital or profit margin; α is the intercept; a is a vector of 
firm-level fixed effects on the outcome variable, because Xij is a vector of firm-level 
characteristics that vary over the i firm in each j province; b is a vector of province-level fixed 
effects on the outcome variable, because Xj is a vector of province-level characteristics that vary 
only over the  j provinces in the sample; uj is a mean zero province-level error term, and eij is a 
mean zero firm-level error term. I estimated models in the forms of Equation 1 with the full 
maximum likelihood method. 
 
5 Statistical results 
Table 1 reports the means and standard deviations of the study variables and Table 2 the zero-
order correlations among the variables. Overall, Chinese private enterprises had high return on 
capital (0.35) and profit margin (0.12), both of which are much higher than SOEs and TVEs, as 
discussed in Section 1. About 52 percent of the interviewed entrepreneurs had political 
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connections, suggesting that exploiting political connections was indeed a widespread 
phenomenon in China’s private sector in the mid 1990s, as mentioned in the previous literature 
(e.g., Peng and Luo 2000; Xin and Pearce 1996; Zhou 2009, 2013). 
 Virtually most, if not all, private enterprises in China entered industries other than the 
high-tech ones in the 1980s and 1990s (OECD 2007; Zhang and Ming 2000; Zhou 2012b).3  
This may be true in our data well. Although the data do not allow us to differentiate clearly high-
tech firms from non-high-tech ones, Table 1 shows that most of the firms were in industries such 
as manufacturing, restaurant, construction, etc., suggesting that most firms were in labor-
intensive low-tech industries.     
 
 [Insert Table 1 and 2 about here] 
  
5.1 Return on capital 
Table 3 reports results for testing the hypotheses using return on capital as a measure for the 
dependent variable. Hypotheses 1 and 2 suggest that both legal protection of property rights and 
market development could improve entrepreneurial performance. Columns 1 and 2 report results 
for testing these two hypotheses. Column 1 includes only province-level variables and is thus 
used as the baseline model. Column 2 adds all firm level variables into the baseline model. In 
both columns, the coefficients of legal protection and market development are positive and 
statistically significant. Thus, I will interpret the coefficients from column 2 as this is the more 
fully specified model. Column 2 suggests that the coefficient of legal protection of property 
3 Most of the high-tech firms were state-owned and the remaining were usually collectively owned in China by the 
late 1990s. High-tech firms founded by university researchers, for example, were usually registered as collective 
firms in the 1980s and 1990s (OECD 2007).    
 31 
                                                 
  
rights is 0.083, more than twice of its standard error (0.033). Substantively, this means that 
average return on capital increases by 8.7 percent (e0.083 – 1 ≈ 0.087) as legal protection of 
property rights increases by 1. Ceteris paribus, a firm in Xinjiang could increase its return on 
capital by 40 percent if legal protection of property rights in Xinjiang would increase from 4.26 
to the level of Guangdong (8.92). Hypothesis 1 is, therefore, supported.  
Column 2 also shows that the coefficient of market development is 0.375, more than 
three times of its standard error (0.108). Substantively, this means that average return on capital 
increases by 45.5 percent (e0.375 – 1 ≈ 0.455) as market development increases by 1. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 2 is also supported.  
Column 3 in Table 2 reports the results for testing the complement view versus the 
substitution view (i.e., hypothesis 3.1 versus hypothesis 3.2 and hypothesis 4.1 versus hypothesis 
4.2) by adding two interaction terms (i.e., interaction between legal protection and political 
connection and interaction between market development and political connection) into the 
equation of column 2. This column shows that the coefficients of both interaction terms are 
negative and statistically significant. Substantively, entrepreneurs with political connections have 
an average return on capital 291 percent (e1.363 – 1 ≈ 2.908) higher than those with no political 
connections when both legal protection and market development are zero; such advantage, 
however, decreases by a factor of 0.883 (e-0.124 ≈ 0.883) as legal protection increases by 1 and a 
factor of 0.908 (e-0.096 ≈ 0.908) as market development increases by 1. These results provide 
strong support to the substitution view, i.e., hypotheses 3.2 and 4.2, but not the complement view 
as in hypotheses 3.1 and 4.1.   
The effects of some of the control variables as shown in column 2 are as follows. GDP 
growth rate has a significantly positive effect, suggesting that entrepreneurs indeed had more 
 32 
  
economic opportunities in regions which were economically healthier.  Consistent with previous 
studies (Martinez 2005; Zhou 2011), GDP per capita has a nonlinear effect on entrepreneurship. 
That is, entrepreneurial performance initially decreases and later increases as GDP per capita 
increases. Firms in centrally administered municipal cities enjoyed significantly higher returns 
on capital. This may be caused, to a substantial degree, by the much more economic 
opportunities in these rich cities. In addition, this may also be caused by the clustering of some 
extremely profitable industrial sectors, such as real estate, high technologies, etc., in these 
municipal cities.  
Education of the entrepreneur has a negative effect. One possible explanation for this is 
that entrepreneurs with higher education were more likely to work in urban service sectors, 
which usually had lower return on capital than the rural manufacturing sector (Zhou 2013). Firm 
size has a significantly positive effect. This may be partly because larger private firms usually 
enjoyed better treatment from the government, and had more economic opportunities (IFC 2000). 
Contrary to the notion of liability of newness, however, firm age, has a negative effect. A 
possible explanation may be that, given their more established market status, older firms had 
more organizational inertia such that they had less motivation to increase profit (Hannan and 
Freeman 1989).   
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
5.2 Profit margin 
Table 4 reports results for testing the hypotheses using profit margin as a measure for the 
dependent variable. The equations in the three columns here are specified in the same way as the 
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ones in Table 3. Thus, results in columns 1 and 2 still test hypotheses 1 and 2 and those in 
column 3 test hypotheses 3.1- 4.2.  
Column 2 in Table 3 suggests that the coefficient of legal protection of property rights is 
0.070, more than twice of its standard error (0.025). Substantively, this means that average profit 
margin increases by 7.3 percent (e0.070 – 1 ≈ 0.073) as legal protection of property rights 
increases by 1. This column also shows that the coefficient of market development is 0.266, 
more than three times of its standard error (0.081). Substantively, this means that average profit 
margin increases by 30.5 percent (e0.266 – 1 ≈ 0.305) as market development increases by 1. 
Therefore, hypotheses 1 and 2 are supported.  
 Column 3 shows that entrepreneurs with political connections have an average profit 
margin 161 percent (e0.723 – 1 ≈ 1.061) higher than those with no political connections when both 
legal protection and market development are zero; such advantage, however, decreases by a 
factor of 0.944 (e-0.058 ≈ 0.944) as legal protection increases by 1 and a factor of 0.946 (e-0.056 ≈ 
0.946) as market development increases by 1. These results, again, provide strong support to the 
substitution view, i.e., hypotheses 3.2 and 4.2, but not the complement view as in hypotheses 3.1 
and 4.1.     
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
5.3 Robustness tests 
Given the inevitable measurement errors in any group-level indices, one may wonder whether 
the results reported above reflect the true effects of legal protection and market development or 
the measurement errors of the two independent variables. To tackle this problem, alternative 
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measures of both legal protection of property rights and market development were tried to retest 
the hypotheses. For legal protection of property rights, an alternative measure used is the 
provincial mean of property rights security reported by the entrepreneurs in the firm-level data 
used in this paper. For market development, the alternative measure used is the marketization 
index constructed by Chen, Wu, and Xie (2000), which measures the development of market 
system in each province in the early 1990s. Additional regressions suggest that these four 
hypotheses are still significantly supported by using these alternative measures.  
 
5.4 Limitations 
This paper also has limitations that may be addressed in future research. Given the cross-
sectional data, we cannot rule out the existence of endogeneity. One source of endogeneity here 
may be omitted variable bias. Although I have controlled a number of variables that are 
correlated with both the dependent and independent variables based on prior studies, it is 
possible that some unmeasured variables, such as regional commercial cultures (Zhou 2011), 
may still create endogeneity problem in this study. Future research may use an instrumental 
variable approach or other econometric methods to resolve this issue.  
Another source of endogeneity may come from reverse causality. In this case, reverse 
causality occurs when those high-performing entrepreneurs may influence the policy making 
procedure by actively lobbying the political elite to construct a modern legal and market system 
that is favorable for entrepreneurial growth (see, e.g., North and Weingast 1989). It may be 
argued, however, that reverse causality is less an issue in this study. In a number of 
contemporary emerging and transition economies like China, it has been found that the 
entrepreneurial class is very weak and the government not only monopolizes political power but 
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also plays a significant role in allocating resources and economic opportunities (Faccio 2006; 
Haber 2002; Siegel 2007). Under such a circumstance, what emerges is not modern capitalism 
but more like crony capitalism, under which the entrepreneurial class, in general, do not have the 
bargaining power to lobby for institutional change but can only request for private protection and 
support from powerful political elite (Faccio 2006; Johnson and Mitton 2003; Zhou 2009). 
Nonetheless, although less likely overall at the national level and in the earlier reform period in 
China, reverse causality may be present and even severe in certain regions, in particular, more 
developed regions, and in more recent years (Zhou 2011). Therefore, future studies should tackle 
the reverse causality problem using either longitudinal data or more advanced statistical 
techniques.       
 
6 Conclusion and discussion  
While prior studies have emphasized the role of political connections in China’s entrepreneurial 
success in the early reform period (1978 – 1999), this research has argued that regional 
institutional environment had been increasingly conducive to entrepreneurial activities and, thus, 
played a key role in facilitating entrepreneurial performance during that period. Empirically, this 
paper demonstrates that not only legal protection of property rights but also the development of 
the market system mattered for entrepreneurial performance. In addition, it shows that political 
connections played a diminishing role in entrepreneurship during China’s formal institutional 
development. 
This paper makes several contributions to the existing literature. First, to the literature on 
Chinese entrepreneurship, the findings of the paper will contribute to understand the rapid 
growth of China’s private entrepreneurial firms in the first two decades of the economic reform 
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(1978 – 1999). As noted previously, the unconducive national institutional environment for 
private entrepreneurship during that period has led many China scholars to argue that informal 
social arrangements (in particular, political connections) are keys to understand the rapid 
entrepreneurial growth in China. Yet, as Baumol (1990) argued forcefully, entrepreneurship will 
be restricted and even unproductive if formal institutions are not conducive. Based on the new 
institutional economic perspective, this study provides an alternative explanation for China’s 
entrepreneurial success in the early reform period. It suggests that, as a result of the 
decentralization reform and regional emulation, regional legal and market institutions had been 
increasingly conducive to entrepreneurial activities and, thus, played a significantly positively 
role in improving entrepreneurial performance, thus facilitating entrepreneurial success, in 
China’s early reform period.  
Second, this paper contributes to the more general new institutional entrepreneurship 
literature by demonstrating that not only legal protection of property rights but also the 
development of market system matter for entrepreneurship. Based on North (1990), the prior 
empirical literature has focused primarily on the role of property rights protection in economic 
and entrepreneurial development. It is less known that North (1991) has also argued that a 
developed market system is crucial for entrepreneurs to capture the gains from trade. Yet, the 
effect of market development has rarely been empirically examined. Based on the unique China 
case, this study demonstrates empirically that both legal protection of property rights and the 
development of market system are significant for entrepreneurial performance.  
This paper may also contribute to the debate on whether political connections 
complement or substitute formal institutions. Although the debate has attracted wide attention, 
there are relatively few quantitative studies on it. Reform-era China provides an excellent case 
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for conducting such an empirical research because it has incurred radical institutional change in 
the past three decades. Although it may not resolve the debate given the cross-sectional data, this 
study is among the first to use large-scale national survey data from China to examine the role of 
political connections during formal institutional change. Future research may employ high 
quality longitudinal data from China to further test whether political connections complement or 
substitute formal institutions.      
As this paper studies the role of formal institutions in entrepreneurial performance in 
China’s early reform period, one may wonder how institutional development may affect both 
entrepreneurial performance and the role of political connections in China more recently. It has 
been noted that regional institutional development is irreversible, as revealed in the past several 
decades in China, because it has brought increasing returns to the regional governments through 
higher government revenues (Naughton 2007; Zhou 2011). This, in turn, has brought further 
institutional changes at the national level. Seeing the increasing benefits of pro-entrepreneurship 
regional policies, the central government finally elevated the status of private entrepreneurial 
firms to that of SOEs in 1999, and introduced an amendment into the Chinese Constitution to 
protect private property rights in 2004 (Zhou 2009). In January 2005, the central government 
promulgated a regulation – “Thirty-six Principles on the Non-public Economy” – to seriously 
tackle the problems of government predation of and discrimination against private firms (Zhou 
2011). All of these new policies are a blessing for private entrepreneurial firms. As a result, 
based on the findings of this paper, we would expect that such national level institutional 
development would further facilitate entrepreneurial performance and growth and that political 
connections would have even less effect on entrepreneurship in China today. Future research 
may investigate this issue using more recent data.        
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Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations of Study Variables 
 
Variables Mean S.D. 
Firm-level Variables   
    Return on capital 0.351 0.721 
    Profit margin 0.122 0.203 
    Political connection (0/1) 0.519 0.491 
    Female (0/1) 0.082 0.272 
    High school degree (0/1) 0.417 0.492 
    College degree or above (0/1) 0.202 0.400 
    Age of owner 39.496 8.699 
    Firm age  8.690 5.805 
    Firm size a 2.937 16.197 
    Registered as public firm (0/1) 0.050 0.216 
    City firm (0/1) 0.299 0.431 
    Main Industrial sector (0/1)     
        Agriculture 0.037 0.188 
        Mining 0.018 0.134 
        Manufacturing 0.384 0.487 
        Utility  0.009 0.094 
        Construction 0.083 0.275 
        Geological exploration 0.002 0.023 
        Transportation 0.032 0.176 
        Restaurant 0.144 0.354 
        Financial and real estate 0.013 0.111 
        Social service 0.054 0.225 
        Health care 0.006 0.076 
        Education 0.026 0.160 
        Research 0.019 0.138 
        Others 0.082 0.274 
   
Provincial-level Variables    
    Legal protection of property rights 6.727 2.314 
    Market development 6.561 1.073 
    GDP growth rate 0.102 0.026 
    Per capita GDP (1000 Chinese Yuan) 4.272 2.712 
    Centrally administered city 0.089 0.285 
    Eastern-coastal province 0.526 0.499 
 
                   a: Firm size is measured with total assets. The unit for firm size is 1 million Chinese Yuan. 
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TABLE 2. Zero-order Correlations between Study Variables 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6     7 8 
1.Return on capital         
2.Profit margin 0.211        
3. Legal protection of 
property rights 
-0.010 -0.037       
4. Market development .0.003 0.052 -.0.496      
5. GDP growth rate 0.045 0.066 -0.314 0.165     
6. Per capita GDP -0.051 -0.058 0.015 0.405 0.056    
7. Centrally adm. city -0.001 -0.025 0.231 0.082 0.055 0.784   
8. Eastern-coastal province -0.068 -0.050 -0.225 0.568 -0.143 0.570 0.264  
9. Political connection 0.002 -0.007 -0.077 -0.023 0.015 -0.040 -0.024 -0.017 
10.Female -0.037 -0.010 0.072 -0.014 -0.102 0.042 0.059 0.073 
11.High school degree 0.002 0.000 0.044 -0.011 0.005 -0.041 0.006 -0.020 
12.College degree or above 0.030 -0.066 0.135 -0.059 -0.043 0.099 0.134 -0.016 
13.Age of owner -0.019 0.027 0.083 -0.013 0.008 0.031 0.005 0.006 
14.Firm age -0.036 -0.022 0.015 0.003 0.051 -0.057 -0.062 -0.015 
15.Firm size  -0.214 -0.164 0.065 -0.080 0.015 0.079 0.068 0.066 
16.Registered as public firm 0.046 0.007 -0.010 -0.036 0.061 -0.020 -0.004 -0.090 
17. City firm 0.031 -0.063 0.196 -0.053 0.035 0.251 0.302 0.017 
Variable 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
9. Political connection         
10.Female -0.000        
11.High school degree 0.046 0.004       
12.College degree or above 0.036 0.028 -0.403      
13.Age of owner -0.022 -0.047 -0.111 -0.112     
14.Firm age -0.074 -0.075 0.001 -0.150 0.262    
15.Firm size 0.097 -0.043 0.051 0.139 0.109 0.210   
16.Registered as public firm 0.068 0.000 0.017 0.015 -0.006 0.024 0.084  
17. City firm -0.007 0.050 -0.054 0.359 0.003 -0.015 0.210 0.021 
 
N = 1913 firms nested in 21 provinces. The dummies for the industrial sectors of the main business line of each firm 
are not reported in this table. Correlations with an absolute value exceeding .05 are significant at p = .05, and 
correlations exceeding .07 are significant at p = .01.  
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TABLE 3. HLM Estimates for Predicting Return on Capital 
  
Variables log(return on capital) 
    
Provincial level variables    
Legal protection of property rights 0.072** 0.083** 0.148*** 
 (0.034) (0.033) (0.036) 
Legal protection of property rights × 
Political connection 
  -0.124*** 
   (0.039) 
Market development 0.347*** 0.375*** 0.405*** 
 (0.110) (0.108) (0.099) 
Market development × Political connection    -0.096** 
   (0.046) 
GDP growth rate  5.295** 4.705** 5.367** 
 (2.389) (2.356) (2.172) 
Per capita GDP -0.488*** -0.517*** -0.483*** 
 (0.134) (0.133) (0.123) 
Per capita GDP squared  0.020*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Centrally adm. city 0.649 0.753* 0.706* 
 (0.403) (0.398) (0.369) 
Eastern-coastal province 0.196 0.163 0.141 
 (0.198) (0.195) (0.173) 
    
Firm-level variables    
Political connection   -0.020 1.363*** 
  (0.074) (0.455) 
Female  -0.038 -0.030 
  (0.140) (0.139) 
High school degree   -0.269*** -0.265*** 
  (0.083) (0.083) 
College degree or above  -0.336*** -0.331*** 
  (0.116) (0.115) 
Log (age of owner)  -0.027 -0.055 
  (0.178) (0.178) 
Log (firm age)  -0.101** -0.101** 
  (0.051) (0.051) 
Log (firm size)  0.064*** 0.066*** 
  (0.024) (0.024) 
Registered as public firm   0.129 0.104 
  (0.180) (0.179) 
City firm   -0.175* -0.180* 
  (0.101) (0.100) 
Industrial sector dummies  added added 
Constant -3.759*** -3.688*** -4.393*** 
 (0.716) (0.947) (0.918) 
σ (eij) 1.329*** 1.309*** 1.306*** 
 (.025) (.025) (.025) 
σ (uj) 0.184*** 0.177*** 0.136** 
 (.054) (.054) (.052) 
Log-likelihood  -2358.010 -2337.661 -2332.544 
    
Observations 1380 1380 1380 
Number of groups 21 21 21 
 
* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 (two-tailed tests)   
Standard errors are in parentheses. The missing values of firm-level control variables were imputed with best-subset regression 
imputation models that use reliable procedure for handling missing data (Little and Rubin 1987).  
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TABLE 4. HLM Estimates for Predicting Profit Margin 
  
Variables log(profit margin) 
    
Provincial level variables    
Legal protection of property rights 0.068** 0.070*** 0.092*** 
 (0.033) (0.025) (0.029) 
Legal protection of property rights × 
Political connection 
  -0.058** 
   (0.024) 
Market development 0.309*** 0.266*** 0.276*** 
 (0.101) (0.081) (0.081) 
Market development × Political connection    -0.056* 
   (0.032) 
GDP growth rate  -1.679 -0.920 -0.171 
 (2.161) (1.707) (1.768) 
Per capita GDP -0.281** -0.207** -0.228** 
 (0.127) (0.100) (0.103) 
Per capita GDP squared  0.008 0.005 0.006 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Centrally adm. city 0.864** 0.749*** 0.673** 
 (0.358) (0.286) (0.290) 
Eastern-coastal province -0.044 -0.050 0.055 
 (0.196) (0.149) (0.155) 
    
Firm-level variables    
Political connection   -0.008 0.723** 
  (0.065) (0.301) 
Female  -0.058 -0.054 
  (0.090) (0.090) 
High school degree   -0.009 -0.011 
  (0.053) (0.053) 
College degree or above  -0.079 -0.080 
  (0.075) (0.075) 
Log (age of owner)  0.063 0.056 
  (0.113) (0.113) 
Log (firm age)  0.033 0.038 
  (0.033) (0.033) 
Log (firm size)  -0.141*** -0.144*** 
  (0.018) (0.018) 
Registered as public firm   0.023 0.014 
  (0.116) (0.116) 
City firm   -0.085 -0.089 
  -0.008 (0.065) 
Industrial sector dummies  added added 
Constant -3.841*** -3.643*** -3.896*** 
 (0.685) (0.666) (0.683) 
σ (eij) 0.920*** 0.886*** 0.888*** 
 (.017) (.016) (.016) 
σ (uj) 0.195*** 0.132*** 0.153*** 
 (.046) (.043) (.039) 
Log-likelihood  -2077.217 -2012.991 -2012.635 
    
Observations 1541 1541 1541 
Number of groups 21 21 21 
 
* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 (two-tailed tests)   
Standard errors are in parentheses. The missing values of firm-level control variables were imputed with best-subset regression 
imputation models that use reliable procedure for handling missing data (Little and Rubin 1987). 
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FIGURE 1. Institutional Development across Chinese Provinces in the mid 1990s. 
 
 
 
Source: Fan and Wang (2000).  
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